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Theories about a necessary link between authoritarianism and
progress have been discredited by history. Now democracy and
development are prominent (though not inseparable) values on nations’
agendas. The link between the two is not a given; it is established by
recognizing that democracy is justified in itself as a universal value that
can be accepted by all. Democracy legitimizes public policies because
it is based on deliberation and a negotiated trade-off of interests, under
transparent rules. Democratic procedures can be used to cope with
unexpected difficulties and strengthen the confidence of outsiders. The
way to deal with the asymmetrical effects of globalization is to participate
in the international economy on more advantageous terms, affirming the
ability of democracy to shape a form of development that is non-
exclusive, unlike that which we experienced in the past. This is no easy
task, and if people are not rewarded by a higher quality of life, then not
only will democracy be in jeopardy, but the economy will not prosper.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso
Former President of the Federal
Republic of Brazil
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  This article is based on the Third Raúl Prebisch Memorial
Lecture, delivered by the author at the Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile, 8 August 2003).
I
The contribution of Prebisch and ECLAC
I began and ended my eight years in government in
close contact with ECLAC, and this is very important for
someone who has always drawn inspiration from that
organization’s determination to comprehend the reality
of Latin America on its own terms. The person who
set ECLAC on this path was, as we all know, Raúl
Prebisch, the inspiration for the memorial lecture that
bears his name.
I once wrote that the greatest merit of ECLAC was
to have copied with originality, and I meant it as praise.
Prebisch is the best example. His work did not come
out of nowhere; he had good sources. He was familiar
with development theory, he knew the classics and the
work of Keynes, he was mindful of Hans Singer’s
achievements and he appreciated the statistical
resources built up by the United Nations.
But he knew how to assimilate during the process
of creation, which is usually the way innovation comes
about in the economic and social sciences. Knowledge
usually evolves through cumulative advances, with the
opening of some new angle or perspective, not through
a radical departure from the existing stock. The key that
Prebisch found was the adaptation of development
theory to the regional context of Latin America.
He showed that international trade had not
brought that region the benefits proclaimed by the
theory of comparative advantage, or by the neoclassical
promise that trade would have a levelling effect on the
remuneration of factors of production across countries.
He also provided an explanation: the capacity for
political organization of workers and businesses in the
countries of the centre prevented the fruits of the
greater technical progress achieved there from being
shared by the Latin American economies in the form
of lower prices for industrial goods. What occurred in
fact was a continuous if uneven deterioration in the
terms of trade of the region’s agricultural products.
Hence his recommendation that industrialization
policies be applied, with the aim not only of increasing
the accumulation capacity of the region’s economies,
but of reorienting its foreign trade profile as well. He
was later to suggest a political arrangement to integrate
national markets. He wanted to ensure the success of
the import substitution process by addressing
requirements of scale, and accordingly he sought to
create the political conditions for an increased role and
perhaps a greater weight for Latin America in the world
economy.
Prebisch was no fatalist, however. He believed in
development, despite internal obstacles and the
asymmetries of international trade. And in this I was
and am his disciple. In the study I carried out with Enzo
Faletto, we never saw any contradiction between
development and dependency (Cardoso and Faletto,
1969). Dependency made development exclusive and
iniquitous, but it did not prevent it. It was the solid
contribution made by foreign capital, combined with
public investment and, to a lesser degree, domestic
private-sector capital, that did so much to improve
economic indicators in many of our countries in the
1960s. The challenge, which was not met, was to
spread the benefits of this growth as widely as possible.
It was to show faith in the idea of political autonomy
and to find a political framework that was more
sensitive to the interests of the majority, and this meant
upholding democracy.
II
Links between politics and economic development
All this takes us on to the interplay between politics
and economic development. This subject —which
enthralled Raúl Prebisch, a fervent believer in politically
guided development— evokes challenges that political
actors will have to face in the new millennium and reminds
us of the effort being made to adapt our economies to new
patterns of competition and productivity, without
neglecting the need to give the State the capability to
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respond to ever more complex and diversified social
demands. My first comment is that democracy and
economic progress have not always been regarded as
compatible. There have been many occasions throughout
history when democratic demands have been inhibited
by the supposed requirements of the economic process.
Universal suffrage has been seen as conflicting with
property rights, social rights with economic growth, and
collective rights with budgetary stability.
In his penetrating review of conservative thought
over the last two centuries, Hirschman (1991) highlights
the weight of economic considerations in the argument
against expanding civic rights. An emblematic case was
the resistance put up to the enactment by the British
Parliament of the liberal reforms of 1832 and 1867.
Both were considered a turning point in the political
history of the United Kingdom, as they brought
domination by an oligarchy to an end by extending the
right to vote.
No less tenacious was the campaign against social
rights in Europe and the United States in the second
half of the twentieth century, the argument being that
extending social rights would reduce opportunities for
growth. In contrast to the Keynesian theories that
judged social spending to be compatible with economic
growth, undue weight was placed on the risks entailed
for fiscal balance and monetary stability by the over-
expansion of the State.
There was also the misgiving that extending social
guarantees could lead to a crisis of governance, a
subject much dwelt upon by the well-known Trilateral
Commission during the 1970s. The fear was that States
might be taking on obligations that would go beyond
their administrative capacity.
III
Politics and economics in Latin America
In Latin America, the conflict between politics and
economics has had somewhat different, more
distinctive features. In a way, it was harder to put that
conflict into the right perspective in Latin America than
elsewhere. I was among those who were unconvinced
by the argument that authoritarianism was a condition
imposed by the logic of the market for the successful
pursuit of import substitution (O’Donnell, 1972). It
seemed clear to me that the Latin American dictatorships
were essentially political phenomena, bolstered by the
ability of the autocrats of the moment to use the spectre
of the Cold War to suppress dissent. The high growth
rates achieved in some years during the 1970s were due
to a huge supply of credit, not to authoritarianism,
which only heightened certain perverse features of the
model such as income concentration.
In the 1980s, in the midst of political liberalization,
the argument that authoritarianism was a force for
progress made a comeback in Latin America. Given
the supposed inability of civilian governments to push
through the reforms known to be necessary to resume
sustainable growth, the performance of authoritarian
regimes in South-East Asia was regularly praised.
We know that, one by one, theories about a
necessary link between authoritarianism and progress
have been discredited by history. Thus, the extension
of suffrage in Europe took place in tandem with the
Second Industrial Revolution, and the advent of the
Welfare State coincided with the powerful upsurge in
the industrial economies that followed World War II.
Latin America did not become a fairer place under its
authoritarian regimes.
Democracy and development are now prime
values on the agendas of all States. Yet, the fact remains
that they are not, by nature, inseparable. While it can
be inferred from the political history of the wealthiest
nations that economic growth is hard to sustain without
wide enjoyment of public freedoms, material affluence
is not always a corollary of democracy.
I prefer to speak of an imperative link, one that
is not automatic; it is rather established following the
recognition that democracy is worth having for itself,
a universal value that can be accepted as such by all.
It is not my purpose to discourage those who seek
affinities between democracy and development. Rather,
I want to help make this search a realistic one.
Many in Latin America expected the end of
authoritarianism to usher in the promised land.
Experience was soon to show us that the way would
be harder and more challenging. The long and painful
recession that this region suffered in the 1980s, when
civilian governments were in place, provided very
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telling proof that politics and economics can give
conflicting signals, that democracy does not necessarily
entail prosperity.
So what is the relationship between democracy
and development? Should we accept the scepticism of
some analysts who, seeing the difficulty of identifying
specific, permanent links between these values, have
chosen to regard them as completely separate and as
interacting only on a random, ad-hoc basis? I am
convinced that we can be more assertive in our
appreciation of the role of democracy. Without
attempting to reduce the benefits of the vote to figures,
it is possible to discern aspects of the democratic
experience that have an undeniable interest for
economic actors and are essential in the quest for
sustainable development.
First of all, there is the matter of legitimacy. We
know that democracy has its own way of setting public
policies, including those that affect economic
management. Decisions cannot do without deliberation.
They are the outcome of a negotiated trade-off of
interests, in accordance with transparent rules and
within a public process.
The benefits this brings for economic management
seem to me obvious, starting with the credibility that
market rules gain in a democracy. Macroeconomic
policies cease to reflect the supposed omniscience of
enlightened technocrats and represent instead a debate
of legitimate interests, a consensus reflecting several
wills, including that of the government itself.
A useful example here is the “Plano Real”, whose
purpose was to stabilize the Brazilian economy. Unlike
previous attempts, all of them unsatisfactory, this Plan
was brought into operation through a lengthy process
of consultation, dialogue, persuasion and adaptation of
points of view. It was not by chance, therefore, that it
was well received by economic agents and by society
in general. This was the result of its legitimacy as a
process.
It was argued at the time that a plethora of
economic preconditions had to be met before any
stabilization plan could be considered. The reality
proved that the necessary economic measures could be
stages in the stabilization effort rather than
prerequisites for it, provided they were applied with
broad and informed political and social support.
Willingness to provide explanations to social actors and
public opinion in general: this was the precondition
without which the Plan Real would not have
succeeded.
Another example of the importance of the
democratic process for overcoming difficulties can be
seen in the Brazilian reaction to the 2001 energy crisis.
When the seriousness of this situation became
clear, the decision was taken to explain everything to
the country, ask the population for cooperation, and
apply strict rationing. Support was widespread. The
mass media set to work and reported thoroughly and
objectively on the issue. For about ten months, the
country as a whole got behind the efforts to restrict
energy consumption in each region (and, in some cases,
in each major city), with all the implications this had
for water reserves (the bulk of energy in Brazil is
hydroelectric). The need for power cuts lasting some
hours a day, as happened in California for example,
was thus avoided. Without question, this collaboration
between the State and society considerably limited the
harm the crisis might have inflicted on the country’s
economy.
Economic decisions that are taken democratically
also prove less vulnerable to the volatile circumstances
in which wealth is generated today. The options usually
available to government authorities for dealing with
crises are shaped by the day-to-day debate between the
government and the political opposition, or by the
internal deliberation mechanisms of the State machine.
It is interesting to recall in this connection the Brazilian
reaction to speculative attacks on our currency, the Real.
The firmness with which this crisis was overcome
would have been difficult to achieve had there been
less democratic transparency and stability, to judge by
the outcome of more authoritarian strategies adopted
in other regions of the world.
I am not suggesting that democracy makes us
immune to the mood of speculators. Decisions
concerning how and when to allocate short-term capital
have escaped the control of government, thereby
causing currencies to be devalued, public accounts to
be destabilized, and interest rates to increase. But this
situation can be changed. There is a growing awareness
among States of the need to re-examine the architecture
of the international financial system and regulate
capital flows more effectively, since the present lack
of controls affects all, rich and poor, albeit to differing
degrees.
I raised this issue for the first time at a conference
held at ECLAC in 1995. At the twenty-ninth session of
the Commission (Brasilia, 2002), I was pleased to learn
from the then Executive Secretary of ECLAC, José
Antonio Ocampo, that the organization had taken up
the challenge and was treating the matter with the
seriousness that the risks involved in it required.
Unfortunately, the example has not been widely
followed and proposals for stricter control and
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monitoring of volatile capital remain absent from the
agenda of the countries with the greatest influence over
the international financial system.
It should be recalled that the idea of regulating
international financial flows was included in the
programme of the Bretton Woods Conference and
accepted in the negotiations. Article VI of the
International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement
provides for the possibility of the IMF asking a member
State to adopt controls to restrain excessive capital
flight and the consequent need to draw on the
organization’s reserves.
It is true that the two main architects of the
Bretton Woods agreement —John Maynard Keynes, an
adviser to the Exchequer (United Kingdom ministry of
finance), and Barry Dexter White of the United States
Treasury Department— were at odds over the degree
of autonomy the Fund should have and the amount of
available reserves. Keynes wanted the IMF to be a true
international central bank that would provide a
counterpoint to the economic power of the United States
and possess, among other prerogatives, the right to create
its own instrument of credit, as a lender of last resort.
White, meanwhile, saw the job of the Fund as being to
ensure balanced growth in world trade in a way that
preserved the central role of the dollar in international
finance. And such was the institution that was created,
anchored solely in the United States currency.
White soon realized, however, that the stability of
the dollar would be jeopardized by the explosive
growth of world trade that was in prospect and the need
for a matching expansion of international reserves. He
then fell in behind Keynes’ position and eventually
proposed that the Fund Articles of Agreement be
revised to allow it to create its own reserves. The
proposal was unsuccessful. Just two decades later the
amendment was to be accepted, leading to the creation
of special drawing rights (SDRs), although in extremely
limited quantities. And the fact is that the expansion
of these SDRs is still being proposed today with a view
to creating a buffer of reserves that can provide better
protection for countries that run into difficulties.
In discussing the importance of democracy as a
basis for foreign policy, some mention must be made
of Mercosur. This was a product of democracy, which
enabled rivalries to be dispelled and trust to grow
between Brazil and Argentina. The process took place
under the auspices of democracy, with the participation
of national societies. The democracy clause was so
effective that it inspired the adoption of similar
mechanisms at the Summit of South American Heads
of State (Brasilia, 2000) and, at the hemispheric level,
at the Third Summit of the Americas (Quebec, 2001).
Had the Southern Cone not been democratized,
Mercosur would not exist; and by existing, integrating
markets, solving crises and creating wealth, it has
promoted democracy beyond its borders. This virtuous
circle confers authority upon its members’ struggle for
a more democratic world order.
To return to the idea which has informed this
whole paper —that the link between democracy and
development is not a given, but is established— it is
important to highlight that this approach places a great
political responsibility on a country’s leadership: the
responsibility both to resist the easy, seductive appeal
of populism, so akin to authoritarianism, and also and
above all to have the boldness to modernize positions,
think anew and explore new paths, when this is what
the common good requires.
There were many occasions when those exercising
power in the Latin America of the 1990s were faced
with this challenge. I refer to situations in which failure
would inevitably have meant dragging the country back
into the past, to outdated formulas. In the face of
globalization, the inevitability of it, the task has been
to seek the most advantageous international positioning
for our countries, without yielding to fantasies of self-
sufficiency, but rather with an awareness that the
process tends to produce asymmetrical effects, to
perpetuate inequalities.
IV
A new growth agenda
In the early twenty-first century, challenges of this
nature remain. What is at stake is more than the
economic performance of the Latin American
democracies. Also being tested is their ability to shape,
democratically, a concept of development different
from the one they have traditionally known:
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development that is not exclusive, that extends to all,
that can eradicate want and put an end to the poverty
in which millions of Latin Americans still live.
But if all this is not to smack of vagueness or even
demagoguery, it is necessary to outline a new growth
agenda.
Since the 1990s it has been clear that, under
present circumstances, there is no place for closed
economies, nor for inflationary financing of
consumption and investment, nor indeed, even in the
cases of countries at an intermediate level of
development, for a straightforward return to the import
substitution policy.
Yet, this does not mean just accepting what has
come to be known as monetary orthodoxy or the
Washington Consensus. Indeed, the Latin American
countries have expanded their education policies,
created social safety nets to offer some hope to the
poorest, and reorganized public-sector administration
and the structure of the State. With few exceptions,
they have not yielded to the “neoliberal” vision of a
minimal State.
The time has come when, along with continuing
efforts to achieve steady productivity growth and
conquer external markets, steps are required to
gradually win back the domestic market.
This is easy to say and hard to do, but not
impossible. Perhaps the most important thing (and this
takes us to the heart of the relationship between
economics and politics) is to grasp what is hardest to
accept: that the ground rules simply cannot be altered,
there are no miracles, and so the way will be long and,
regrettably, what leaders will have to offer is “sweat
and tears”.
But sweat and tears without reward obviously lead
to discouragement (to social discontent, to outbreaks
of disorder, to the demoralization of governments) that
makes the promises of populists attractive. So the path
of gradual progress —and there is no other— is only
acceptable if the progress is continuous and benefits
all.
Our political leaderships have not been firm
enough in explaining the difficulties along the way.
There has also been a failure, nationally and
internationally, to understand that without adequate
rewards in the form of better quality of life, not only
is democracy jeopardized, but the economy itself will
not prosper.
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